Similar to Afghanistan, Iraq has received UN and non-UN peace operations. This section focuses only on UN peace operations. The United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG) was established by Security Council resolution 619 on August 9, 1988, with the mandate to verify, confirm and supervise the ceasefire and the withdrawal of all forces to internationally recognized boundaries, pending a comprehensive settlement (UN 2003c, par. 1). The United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) was established in April 1991, following the forced withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Its task was to monitor the demilitarized zone along the Iraq-Kuwait border, deter border violations and report on any hostile action. The mandate was completed on October 6, 2003 (UN 2003d, par. 1).
Security Council Resolution 1546 states that the mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI)
shall: 1) Assist in the convening, during the month of July 2004, of a national conference to select a Consultative Council; 2) Advise and support the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq, as well as the Interim Government of Iraq and the Transitional National Assembly, on the process for holding elections. (2005, par. 1)
UN/UN peacekeeping policy reform
No record.
Perception of peacekeeping
No record.
Domestic political environment
Violence continues to increase and it continues unabated (EIU 2006br, 1). The US Defence Department quarterly report to the US Congress, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” completed in late August, states that weekly attacks increased by 15% over the previous quarter, and Iraqi casualties were up by 51% (Ibid. quoting Defence Department 2006). Iraq has been the battleground of a variety of forces vying for power since the US-led invasion which toppled the government in 2003 (BBC 2006x, par. 1) The government of national unity and the US-led coalition forces are struggling to establish control; thousands of civilians have been killed and security forces are under constant threat from well organized rebels (Ibid.).
During 2007-2008, the Iraqi government will struggle to make much impact on the sectarian conflict being waged by Iraqi militias for political and territorial advantage (EIU 2006br, 1). The coalition presence is increasingly irrelevant, as the struggle between these forces for control on the ground takes centre stage (Ibid.).
Furthermore, the interest of different Shia parties in the south in gaining control over the oil sector will make substantive constitutional compromise difficult. Some points of agreement exist between parts of the Shia coalition and the Sunni Arab and Kurdish politicians represented in parliament. However, sectarian considerations are likely to prevent a realignment leading to a new government. The increasing prospect is that Iraq will not see a marked reduction of violence over the forecast period. Local territorial conflicts are likely, as opposed to larger-scale secessionist moves, although such a scenario is possible in Iraqi Kurdistan, unless a compromise is reached over the final status of Kirkuk. As long as there is sufficient commitment to a national political process, though, the complete collapse of the country is unlikely. Oil production growth will be constrained by security problems and persistent underinvestment, but modest increases in output will occur in 2007. (Ibid.)
The war with Iran from 1980 to 1988 and the Gulf War in 1991 following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, together with the subsequent imposition of international sanctions, had a devastating effect on its economy and society (BBC 2006x, par. 2). In 1991 the UN said Iraq had been reduced to a pre-industrial state; later reports described living standards as being at subsistence level (Ibid.).
Iraq’s primary economic objective will be to increase oil output on a sustainable basis from the 2005 average of around 1.8m barrels/day (b/d) to the claimed capacity level of 2.5m b/d (EIU 2006br, 9). This target is looking increasingly unrealistic (Ibid.).
Military affairs
The Iraqi armed forces largely melted away during the US-led invasion in 2003 (EIU 2006u, 23). This, along with the subsequent official disbanding of the armed forces and the destruction of much of Iraq’s military equipment, provided a limited base from which to re-establish an armed force (Ibid.). But this new armed force has proven to be insufficient. Furthermore, the retention and training of Iraqi forces has proven difficult, although there is some evidence that there has been an increase in capabilities in some counter-insurgency operations conducted in 2005, and a reduction in the loss of numbers in the face of what in 2004 were highly unpopular military deployments involving heavy US firepower (Ibid.).
The coalition forces are the main source of military strength in Iraq (Ibid., 25). The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) states in the 2004/05 edition of The Military Balance that the total number of coalition military forces in Iraq is around 143,600, consisting of some 121,600 US troops and 23,000 forces from a total of 31 other countries (Ibid. quoting IISS 2005).
Foreign policy
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) is actively pursuing normalization of diplomatic relations with the international community on the basis of cooperation and respect for mutual interests and international law (IMFA 2003, par. 4).
The MFA has stated that challenge is to promote and protect Iraq's interests through active participation in multilateral forums and initiatives, in all fields of political, economic, social and cultural exchange. The new Iraq is committed to abiding by international rules and the universal principles of human rights, democracy and good governance and we reject the illegal proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. (Ibid.)
Nevertheless, participation in UN peace operations is unlikely. In the region, the priority “is to stabilize our country and secure its borders as we confront international terrorism, intent on destabilizing the democratic process and destroying our progress towards peace and prosperity” (Ibid., par. 7).
Additional variables found after the preliminary analysis:
Climate changes
No record.
Independent negotiations taken by DPKO to seek troops
No record.
Independent negotiations taken by contributor countries to engage non-contributor countries
No record.
Meetings organized by other international organizations to engage in dialogue about peacekeeping
No record.